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I. INTRODUCTION 
California’s prison system is the largest of any state.1 As of the end of May 
2011, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) 
housed roughly 147,000 adult inmates within its institutions,2 which exceeds their 
designed holding capacity by 175 percent.3 The system as a whole was designed 
to hold approximately 84,000 inmates.4 Over the past several decades, 
California’s prison population has increased dramatically.5 Some commentators 
attribute much of this expansion to the adoption of pro-punishment sentencing 
policies that have done little to further public safety or reduce recidivism but 
instead have racked up costs and decreased safety and access to necessary 
services within the prisons themselves.6 
Through a series of class-action lawsuits brought by CDCR inmates 
challenging the constitutionality of the prison system’s medical and mental 
healthcare, the federal courts took notice of California’s overcrowded prisons and 
state lawmakers’ unwillingness to address them.7 After making their way through 
 
1. Sara Mayeux, Mass Incarceration: Breaking Down the Data by State, PRISON L. BLOG (July 13, 
2010, 6:37 AM), http://prisonlaw.wordpress.com/2010/07/13/mass-incarceration-breaking-down-the-data-by-
state/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
2. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF 
MIDNIGHT MAY 31, 2011, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_ 
Information_Services_Branch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad1105.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME IS RUNNING OUT 
17 (2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185/Report185.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (“[F]rom 1980 to 2006, the inmate population surged more than 600 percent, adding an average of 
5,500 inmates a year.”). 
6. See id. at 17–21. The Commission found that the sentencing policies employed in California since 
1980 led to a six-hundred percent increase in those incarcerated in state, which “threatens safety of prison staff 
and inmates and obstructs the efficient delivery of services needed to prepare inmates for parole and prevent 
recidivism.” Id. at 17–18. Additionally, the study showed that, during the same period, the CDCR’s budget has 
expanded from about four percent of California’s budget to about eight percent, from about $1 billion to $9 
billion per year. Id. at 21; see also Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for a Wholesale Reform of 
California’s Sentencing Practice and Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903, 917 (2004) (calling California’s 
sentencing laws “a Byzantine sentencing scheme without a coherent penal philosophy”). 
7. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *4 (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (“Although California’s existing prison system serves neither the public nor the inmates 
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the federal courts, the cases reached the United States Supreme Court in 
consolidated form.8 
In Brown v. Plata, the Court affirmed a lower court’s declaration that 
California’s prison-healthcare system was so inadequate in meeting the needs of 
inmates that it violated the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and 
unusual punishment.9 A divided Court found the primary cause of the system’s 
inadequacy to be the extreme overcrowding of inmates.10 It also held that given 
California’s current bleak fiscal outlook, the only feasible way of remedying the 
constitutional violation was to cut the incarcerated population drastically.11 In 
affirming the order of a special three-judge panel convened under the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),12 the Court stated that California must reduce its 
prison population to no more than 137.5% of capacity within the next two years, 
a reduction of between 38,000–46,000 prisoners.13 This mandate, along with 
California’s budgetary woes,14 has “dragged the state’s political class into a long 
delayed reckoning with [the] fatally flawed penal system.”15 
California’s plan to meet the Court’s mandate came in the form of AB 109, 
dubbed “the 2011 Realignment Legislation addressing public safety” 
(Realignment).16 Proclaimed as the biggest change to California’s criminal law 
since the passage of Determinate Sentencing in 1978,17 Realignment seeks to 
reduce California’s high recidivism rates18 and institutional costs, through 
 
well, the state has for years been unable or unwilling to implement the reforms necessary to reverse its 
continuing deterioration.”). 
8. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). The Eight Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
9. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1947. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006). 
13. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928. 
14. See The 2011–12 Budget: California’s Fiscal Outlook, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Nov. 10, 
2010), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2010/bud/fiscal_outlook/fiscal_outlook_2010.aspx#chap1 (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (stating California’s budget deficit of about $20 billion will persist for the next several 
years). 
15. Jonathan Simon, California Penal Policy: Realignment and Beyond, BERKELEY BLOG (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2011/10/11/california-penal-policy-realignment-and-beyond/ (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
16. AB 109, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011). In addition to AB 109, Realignment is comprised 
of several other bills, including AB 116, AB 117, AB 118, and AB 94. See GARRICK BYERS, REALIGNMENT 
15–16 (2011), available at http://www.claraweb.us/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/California-Public-Safety-
Realignment-Analysis-by-Garrick-Byers-December-19-2011-Edition-3.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (detailing what bills comprise Realignment’s reforms). 
17. Robert Weisberg, California’s De Facto Sentencing Commissions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1 
(2011), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/californias-de-facto-sentencing-commissions (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
18. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2010 CDCR ADULT INSTITUTIONS 
OUTCOME EVALUATION REPORT 3 (2010), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch 
/Research_Documents/ARB_FY0506_Outcome_Evaluation_Report.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
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“realigning” the State’s incarceration practices by focusing on localized 
punishment for many offenders.19 The main feature of Realignment is to redefine 
sentencing for many low-level felonies, or “non-non-nons,”20 by having offenders 
carry out their sentences in local county jails instead of state prisons.21 Additional 
major changes include increased sentence-reduction credits for county jail 
inmates and an overhaul of the State’s parole system, shifting would-be parolees 
to post-release supervision within their own counties.22 Additionally, 
Realignment requires each of the State’s fifty-eight counties to set up a 
Community Corrections Partnership (CCP) to create a plan for the county to meet 
Realignment’s new demands,23 effectively creating fifty-eight separate de facto 
sentencing commissions.24 
Many see Realignment’s plan as a step in the right direction for California,25 
including the Supreme Court, which alluded to the law’s passage in Plata.26 
However, others claim that the plan will create a massive public safety hazard for 
the State’s counties.27 Regardless, the true issue is whether this new, untested 
 
Review) (reporting that, during the fiscal year of 2005–2006, 67.5% of all inmates released by CDCR returned 
to prison within three years). 
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(5) (West Supp. 2012) (“Realigning low-level felony offenders who 
do not have prior convictions for serious, violent, or sex offenses to locally run community-based corrections 
programs, which are strengthened through community-based punishment, evidence-based practices, improved 
supervision strategies, and enhanced secured capacity, will improve public safety outcomes among adult felons 
and facilitate their reintegration back into society.”). 
20. A “non-non-non felony” is the informal moniker given to felonies sentenced with jail time because 
the legislature considers them to be non-serious, non-violent, and non-PC-290 registerable crimes. BYERS, 
supra note 16, at 11. 
21. PENAL § 1170(h)(2); see also BYERS, supra note 16 (detailing the changes AB 109 makes to 
California’s sentencing scheme). 
22. PENAL § 3451. 
23. Id. § 1230(b)(1). 
24. Weisberg, supra note 17, at 6. 
25. See Nick Wilson, Jail Realignment Could Mean Less Recidivism, Expert Says, SAN LUIS OBISPO 
TRIB. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.sanluisobispo.com/2011/10/17/1800391/jail-realignment-could-mean-
less.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that Realignment could lead to recidivism 
reduction); Jonathan Shapiro, Op-Ed, L.A.’s Prison Realignment Opportunity, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/12/opinion/la-oe-1012-shapiro-realignment-20111012 (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (“If done right, realignment could revolutionize and repair the incarceration-only 
policies that have led to both the nation’s highest costs per inmate and the nation’s highest state recidivism 
rate.”). 
26. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011) (“The State has already made significant progress 
toward reducing its prison population, including reforms that will result in shifting ‘thousands’ of prisoners to 
county jails.”). 
27. See Kevin Yamamura, Jerry Brown’s Prison Plan Under Fire from Republicans, Democrats Alike, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.sacbee.com/2011/10/16/3983172/jerry-browns-prison-plan-
under.html#mi_rss=Top%20Stories (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (restating the opinions held by 
some high-ranking county officials that Realignment will undoubtedly lead to more crime); Michael D. 
Antonovich, AB 109 Is Set to Bankrupt Counties, Jeopardize Citizens, DAILY NEWS L.A. (June 26, 2011), 
http://www.dailynews.com/opinions/ci_18371169 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that 
shifting the correctional burden onto the counties will lead to overcrowded jails, increased county costs, and an 
overall reduction in public safety). 
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plan will solve California’s penal woes and stand as a model system for 
community-centric corrections for other states. This Comment argues that 
Realignment will create challenges for California’s counties, but the State can 
lessen the impact of those challenges if the legislature implements (1) financial 
incentives that encourage alternatives to jail time and (2) a statewide uniform 
actuarial risk assessment tool that is standardized enough to create consistency in 
sentencing, but flexible enough to meet the needs of the individual counties. 
Part II examines the federal courts’ action and California’s inaction leading 
up to the Plata decision, as well as the decision itself. Part III analyzes the 
changes to California’s penal law made by Realignment. This Part describes the 
provisions in the new law that will likely prove most successful in achieving 
California’s goals. Part IV analyzes some of the challenges that California’s 
counties will face in their attempt to implement Realignment’s current 
formulation. Lastly, Part V discusses how the State can shift its incentive 
structure to guide counties towards increasing the use of proven non-
incarceration interventions. In addition, this Part advocates for the development 
of a uniform actuarial risk instrument that judges and other county officials 
would be required to use in making sentencing decisions. In developing the 
instrument’s contents, this Comment looks to Virginia, the first state to 
implement such an instrument,28 as well as other factors that are specific to 
counties with certain population characteristics. 
II. FORCING CHANGE: FEDERAL COURT ACTION SPURRED BY STATE INACTION 
Realignment did not simply appear out of the ether; rather, its reforms to 
California’s penal law are a response to over thirty years of prior sentencing law 
and a series of federal civil rights cases brought by California prisoners.29 In this 
Part, this Comment explains some of the history behind California’s sentencing 
regime leading up to the enactment of Realignment, how that regime led to a 
swell in prison population, and the federal litigation that forced California 
lawmakers to address the prison population boom. 
A. The Catalyst: Thirty Years of New Sentencing Laws 
For most of the twentieth century, California employed an “indeterminate” 
sentencing scheme, a system that sentenced most offenders for a very broad term, 
such as one year to life, with a parole board periodically reviewing inmates to 
 
28. See generally BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE 
EVALUATION (2002), available at http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/risk_off_rpt.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (discussing the development of the risk assessment instrument in Virginia). 
29. See infra Part II.A–C (detailing the historical and legal background of Realignment’s enactment). 
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determine whether they are sufficiently rehabilitated to reintegrate into society.30 
In 1977, California reversed this sentencing scheme when it enacted its 
determinate sentencing law,31 paralleling similar developments occurring across 
the nation.32 Under determinate sentencing, the penological purpose behind 
incarceration shifted from rehabilitation to punishment.33 California's determinate 
sentencing law operates by providing three different possible time periods for 
incarceration that a convicted person can face: a lower, middle, or upper term.34 
As enacted in 1977,35 the law required a judge to sentence a convicted offender to 
the middle term unless the judge found aggravating or mitigating circumstances, 
which would lead to an upper- or lower-term sentence, respectively.36 The law’s 
principal drafter acknowledged that “only future experience can provide any 
definitive answers” as to whether incarceration rates would rise.37 
Now, after thirty years of “future experience,” we know definitively that 
incarceration rates have increased exponentially.38 Many blame determinate 
sentencing, at least in part, for the prison population explosion over the past 
several decades—an expansion from around 20,000 inmates before the law’s 
passage to about 160,000 as of late 2011.39 Governor Jerry Brown, who 
advocated for and signed the determinate sentencing law, now acknowledges it as 
 
30. Sara Mayeux, California Sentencing Law: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been, PRISON L. BLOG 
(Feb. 9, 2010, 7:28 PM), http://prisonlaw.wordpress.com/2010/02/09/california-sentencing-law-what-a-long-
strange-trip-its-been/ [hereinafter California Sentencing Law] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
31. Id. 
32. See PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE PROMISE AND REALITY OF RETRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE 39 (1991) (stating that all fifty states and the District of Columbia enacted or considered enacting 
legislation between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s to replace their old sentencing schemes with determinate 
sentencing). 
33. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (“The Legislature finds and declares that the 
purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”). 
34. California Sentencing Law, supra at note 30. 
35. The U.S. Supreme Court declared a portion of the 1977 version of the law unconstitutional under the 
Sixth Amendment in 2007. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). In Cunningham, the Court held that 
judge-made factual determinations regarding sentence-elevating aggravating factors violate a defendant’s right 
to trial by jury. Id. at 274. California has since amended its determinate sentencing law to place such 
determinations in the hands of the jury, but determinations of mitigating factors by the judge and the three-tier 
term system from the 1977 law are still in place. PENAL § 1170(a)(3). 
36. April Kestell Cassou & Brian Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers 
Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5, 23 (1978). 
37. Id. at 30. 
38. See JOAN PETERSILIA, CAL. POLICY RESEARCH CTR., UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 
62 (2006), available at http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/pdf/UnderstandingCorrectionsPetersilia20061.pdf 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that California’s prison population began to drastically rise 
after the passage of the determinate sentencing legislation); Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 
LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *20 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (“The expansive growth of the prison 
population in California is due, in part, to the state’s adoption of determinate sentencing in the 1970s . . . .”). 
39. PETERSILIA, supra note 38, at 62; see also Elliot Currie, “Realigning” Criminal Justice in 
California: Real Reform, or Shifting the Deck Chairs?, DISSENT.ORG (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www. 
dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=554 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that that increased 
sentence terms, in addition to the “Three Strikes” law, led to the dramatic increase in population). 
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“‘an abysmal failure . . . [creating] a scandalous merry-go-round of crime [that 
has] . . . saddled California with parolees who are ill prepared for release.’”40 The 
requirement that all ex-felons be placed on parole resulted in many being sent 
back to prison for minor violations.41 This created a game of “catch and release” 
that retained a population of minor repeat offenders while new offenders further 
added to the prison population.42 Determinate sentencing, and various laws 
passed pursuant to it, played a role in the extreme prison population rise, 
resulting in high recidivism rates and a “revolving door” for many offenders.43 
Since the enactment of determinate sentencing, the California Legislature has 
passed a large number of crime bills, enacted in response to media stories about 
sensational crimes, imposing sentence enhancements that lead to more 
convictions and longer sentences.44 This trend, along with the passage of the 
“Three Strikes” law in 1994 (under which more than one-quarter of all of 
California’s incarcerated are currently serving extended or life sentences),45 
constitutes the legal backdrop to the increasing population that paved the road to 
the Plata litigation and California’s eventual reaction in the form of 
Realignment.46 
B.  The Road to Plata: Coleman v. Schwarzenegger as a Federal Reaction to a 
Swelling Prison Population 
Within two decades of the implementation of determinate sentencing, the 
federal courts began to hear Eighth Amendment claims filed by California 
inmates regarding the declining institutional conditions as a result of the increase 
in prison population.47 Initiating their case in 1990, the class of inmate plaintiffs 
in Coleman claimed that the mental health services within CDCR’s facilities 
were so inadequate that they violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment.48 In 2001, another set of plaintiffs raised a similar claim in 
Plata with respect to the CDCR’s ability to administer general medical care to 
 
40. PETERSILIA, supra note 38, at 61 (alterations in original). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 71. 
43. See id. at 61–64 (explaining that a determinate sentence gives inmates little incentive to rehabilitate 
themselves while incarcerated, thus leading to high recidivism rates). 
44. Id. at 61–62. 
45. CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, STEADY CLIMB: STATE CORRECTIONS SPENDING IN CALIFORNIA 8 (2011), 
available at http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2011/110914_Corrections_Spending_BB.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
46. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *19–20 
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (explaining which of California’s penal policies, including determinate sentencing, 
have led to the rise in prison population that formed the basis for the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim). 
47. E.g., Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
48. Id.  
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the inmate population.49 In both cases, the courts granted injunctive relief 
requiring the CDCR to take remedial measures to bring its inmate health services 
up to Eighth Amendment standards.50 In Coleman, the court appointed a special 
master to oversee compliance with the order,51 while Plata ended in settlement 
with the CDCR stipulating to bring its medical care up to Eighth Amendment 
standards.52 
While some minor improvements occurred in the years following each of 
these cases, the federal courts still found that California’s prison-healthcare 
system fell short of constitutional standards.53 This led to the court appointing a 
federal receiver in Plata to “provide leadership and executive management of the 
California prison medical health care delivery system,”54 and the court issuing 
over seventy court orders in Coleman regarding the progress of the remedial 
measures.
55
 Despite the federal oversight and the CDCR’s continued efforts 
towards compliance, by the time Coleman and Plata were consolidated under the 
PLRA,56 the federal court found that the continued severe overcrowding of 
California’s prisons rendered achieving constitutional compliance unattainable 
without a more drastic order.57 
In Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, the special three-judge court made an 
unprecedented order for the reduction of the inmate population from almost 190 
percent of designed capacity to 135.7 percent within two years.58 The court 
determined that the primary reason behind the constitutional deficiencies in care 
was the extensive overcrowding in the CDCR’s adult facilities.59 The court found 
 
49. Plata v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing the claim made by the plaintiffs in 
the initial Plata class action). 
50. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1324; Plata, 329 F.3d at 1104. 
51. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1324. 
52. Order Adopting Class Action Stipulation as Fair, Reasonable and Adequate at 3, Plata v. Davis, No. 
C-01-1351 TEH (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2002). 
53. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *3–19 (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (chronicling the procedural history of both Plata and Coleman). 
54. Id. at *11 (citation omitted). 
55. See id. at *15 (stating that the orders were directed towards specific issues such as having adequate 
beds, space, and staff available for those inmates at the higher levels of the mental health care delivery system). 
56. In 2007, the plaintiffs in both class actions brought motions to convene a three-judge panel pursuant 
to the PLRA that would consider whether a more drastic “prisoner release order” should be made by the courts 
in order to remedy the violations. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2007 WL 2122657, *6 (N.D. 
Cal. July 23, 2007); Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2007 WL 2122636, *30–31 
(E.D. Cal. July 23, 2007). Under the PLRA, a special three-judge court may convene and order a mandatory 
reduction of prison population when a court has previously entered into an order for less intrusive relief and the 
defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous orders, but has yet to do so. 18 
U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
57. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *2 (“[O]vercrowding in California’s prisons render[s] the efforts of 
the courts, the Coleman Special Master, and the Plata Receiver utterly insufficient.”). 
58. Id. at *116. 
59. Id. at *2. 
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that the only feasible remedy was a population reduction,60 which satisfied the 
prerequisites for such an order under the PLRA.61 Additionally, the court 
recognized that the overcrowding led to an environment where “high-risk 
inmates do not rehabilitate and low-risk inmates learn new criminal behavior,” 
thus leading to a high recidivism rate and a public threat of prisoners leaving 
incarceration as greater threats to society than when they had first entered.62 It 
also found that population reduction would be feasible through means that would 
not adversely affect public safety and the criminal justice system.63 The court 
suggested population-reduction measures including: the expansion of the use of 
good time credits for early release and evidence-based rehabilitative programs; 
diversion of technical parole violators and low risk and short-term offenders to 
county jails and other local programs instead of prisons; and other sentencing 
reforms.64 Although some of these suggested reforms would make their way into 
the Realignment legislation,65 California initially resisted this order by appealing 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.66 
C.  The Tipping Point: Brown v. Plata 
During oral arguments in Plata, Justice Kennedy, responding to arguments 
made by the attorney for California, stated, “the problem . . . is that at some point 
the court has to say: You’ve been given enough time; the constitutional violation 
still persists, as the State itself acknowledges.”67 The tenor of this statement 
pervades Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion upholding the three-judge court’s 
reduction order.68 The opinion highlights the urgency and persistence of the 
constitutional violations created within California’s prisons due to overcrowding 
by using a multitude of shocking anecdotes from the factual record.69 To 
emphasize the effect of overcrowding on the healthcare violations, Justice 
 
60. Id. 
61. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the requirements under the PLRA for a court 
to issue a release order). 
62. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *86–87. 
63. Id. at *88. 
64. Id. at *87–99. 
65. See BYERS, supra note 16, at 13–20 (explaining the changes Realignment makes, including 
expanding the use of “good time” credits and the diversion of parole violators to short-term incarceration in 
county jails). 
66. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (No. 09–1233). 
68. E.g., Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1930 (“Both were given ample time to succeed. When the three-judge court 
was convened, 12 years had passed since the appointment of the Coleman Special Master, and 5 years had 
passed since the approval of the Plata consent decree. The State does not claim that either order achieved a 
remedy.”). 
69. See id. at 1924 (“A psychiatric expert reported observing an inmate who had been held in . . . a cage 
for nearly 24 hours, standing in a pool of his own urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic. Prison officials 
explained they had ‘no place to put him.’”). 
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Kennedy included photos in the opinion depicting the cramped living conditions 
present in several California prisons.70 
In rejecting the argument that the lower court did not give California enough 
time for its prior remedial measures to show results, the Court recognized that, 
without a nudge from the federal judiciary towards more drastic and inventive 
efforts, the State’s previous measures would not remedy the constitutional 
violations within a reasonable timeframe.71 However, realizing the complexity of 
conducting such a large population reduction safely, as well as the sensitive 
federalism issue,72 the Court gave state officials discretion in how to meet the 
mandate.73 Additionally, the Court stated that the mandate’s timeline and terms 
are open to modification if the State showed that such a modification would be 
necessary or desirable.74 These terms of the order, as one commentator puts it, 
“nudge[s] the state toward sustainable change while balancing the need for time 
to devise orderly, considered reforms to mitigate safety concerns.”75 
III. CALIFORNIA’S SOLUTION: THE LEGISLATURE’S PLAN FOR “REALIGNMENT” 
With the passage of AB 109 on April 4, 2011, California began its attempt to 
reform its unsustainable and constitutionally infirm sentencing structure by 
making a series of largely unprecedented changes to California’s penal laws.76 
This Part discusses several of the major changes Realignment makes to 
California’s sentencing scheme and explains why several of these changes will 
contribute to Realignment’s chance at becoming a model scheme for community-
centric corrections. 
Most of the reforms to California’s sentencing structure made by 
Realignment went into operation on October 1, 2011.77 Realignment has three 
related goals: cutting the recidivism rate, reducing costs, and improving public 
 
70. See id. at 1949–50 (depicting inmate living arrangements at several institutions, with groups of 
inmates living almost on top of one another). 
71. See id. at 1931 (“The Coleman and Plata courts had a solid basis to doubt that additional efforts to 
build new facilities and hire new staff would achieve a remedy. Indeed, although 5 years have now passed since 
the appointment of the Plata Receiver and approval of the revised plan of action in Coleman, there is no 
indication that the constitutional violations have been cured.”). 
72. See Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 599 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[U]nless a state law is found to 
violate a federal law, or unless the Injunction is found necessary to remedy a constitutional violation, federalism 
principles require the reconciliation of the state law and federal injunction. . . . [T]he scope of federal injunctive 
relief against an agency of state government must always be narrowly tailored to enforce federal constitutional 
and statutory law only.”). 
73. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1943. 
74. Id. at 1947. 
75. Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 
620 (2012). 
76. AB 109, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
77. BYERS, supra note 16, at 13. 
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safety.78 The legislative purpose behind the reforms is not to reduce the prison 
population;79 however, in pursuing its goals through the changes it makes to the 
law, Realignment will lead to some reduction.80 California’s legislature 
acknowledges this inevitability by admitting that the prior correctional policy 
centered on incarceration, increased spending, and prison construction does not 
work because the result was an unsustainable increase in the prison population.81 
The passage of AB 109, the main body of Realignment’s legislation, occurred 
just prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Plata and incorporates several of 
the changes suggested by the Coleman court, making it clear that the pending 
Plata decision and the continued pressure from the lower federal courts played a 
role in Realignment’s formulation.82 
A. Realignment’s Major Changes to California’s Penal Law 
1. The Creation of County Jail Felonies 
The biggest alteration Realignment makes to California’s sentencing 
structure is the creation of county jail felonies.83 Prior to Realignment, all felony 
offenses required serving incarceration in prison, including low-level offenses 
requiring only one year or more of confinement.84 By rebranding the majority of 
non-violent and other low-level felony offenses as county jail felonies, violators 
of these crimes now serve all or part of their sentences in a jail in the county in 
which they are convicted.85 During sentencing, judges have the discretion to 
sentence those convicted of county jail felonies to jail with no post-release 
supervision or to spend only part of their time in jail and the remainder under the 
supervision of a county probation officer.86 Determinate sentencing’s triad of 
possible term times still applies to most county jail felonies, including any that do 
not state a mandatory term time in the statute for the underlying offense.87 
 
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (West Supp. 2012). 
79. Id. § 17.5(b). 
80. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., FACT SHEET: 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/Realignment-Fact-Sheet.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (stating that Realignment is the cornerstone of California’s effort to reduce its prison population). 
81. PENAL § 17.5(a)(1)–(5). 
82. See Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Governor, Cal. State, to the Members of the Cal. State Assembly 
(Apr. 4, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that Governor Brown signed AB 109 into law, 
in part, because the new law will reverse the aggravation of prison crowding created by the prior sentencing 
regime). 
83. PENAL § 17(a); id. § 1170(h). 
84. Burr v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 350 F.2d 87, 90 (9th Cir. 1965) (“[A] felony in 
California ‘is a crime punishable by a state prison sentence . . . .’”). 
85. PENAL § 1170(h)(5). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. § 1170(h)(1) (“[A] felony punishable [as a county jail felony] where the term is not specified in 
the underlying offense shall be punishable by a term of imprisonment in a county jail for 16 months, or two or 
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The legislature’s reasoning behind the shift in the location of incarceration is 
that “[r]ealign[ment of] low-level felony offenders . . . will improve public safety 
outcomes among adult felons and facilitate their reintegration back into 
society.”88 Although the full effect of Realignment’s changes are not expected to 
be completely realized until 2015, some within California’s government credit 
the diversion of low-level inmates for the roughly 7,000 prison inmate reduction 
experienced two months after Realignment’s implementation.89 This development 
contributes to the optimism that Realignment will be sufficient to meet the Plata 
mandate,90 in addition to meeting its other goals. 
2.  The Placement of Most of Those Released from Prison on Post-Release 
Community Supervision Instead of Parole 
Under Realignment, certain felonies are exempt from being carried out in 
county jail; instead, they are required to be served in prison, just as they would 
have under California’s prior sentencing scheme.91 These “state prison felonies” 
include crimes the legislature deems serious, violent, or sex offenses requiring 
registration under California Penal Code section 290.92 Additionally, anyone who 
commits any of the almost eighty other offenses that do not fall into the above 
categories, or who has prior convictions for any of the above offenses, is required 
to serve time in prison instead of jail.93 
Though little has changed under Realignment regarding time spent in prison 
for these crimes, what has changed is what happens to many of those imprisoned 
for these crimes when they are released.94 Under Realignment’s Postrelease 
Community Supervision Act, all released prisoners with a conviction offense not 
requiring parole under Penal Code section 3451(b) are subject to Postrelease 
 
three years.”). 
88. Id. § 17.5(a)(5). 
89. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS YEAR AT A GLANCE FALL 2011, at 5–6 (2011), 
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/2011_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter CDCR YEAR AT 
A GLANCE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
90. See id. at 5 (stating that CDCR expects to meet its one-year inmate population reduction benchmark 
of 155 percent design capacity, putting it in line with meeting the Plata Court’s mandate). 
91. PENAL § 1170(h)(3). 
92. BYERS, supra note 16, at 19 (“[P]ersons released from prison who are not required to be on parole, 
are released on up to three years of Postrelease Community Supervision (PRCS).”). 
93. See id. at 137–40 (listing all the statutes for felonies that do not fall into the serious, violent, or PC-
290 registerable categories, but still require prison time). Examples of such crimes include: the manufacture of 
methamphetamine or phencyclidine in a structure where a child under sixteen years of age is present; a public 
official aiding and abetting another in the commission of voter fraud; and driving with a willful or wanton 
disregard for the safety of others while fleeing from a pursuing police officer. See id. 
94. Id. at 17, 19. 
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Community Supervision (PCRS) for up to three years.95 PCRS is similar to parole 
in that felons must adhere to release conditions during the required period.96 
However, there are several major differences. The first is the agency in 
charge of overseeing released felons.97 Under PCRS, the board of supervisors for 
each county is required to designate a local agency98 to handle “supervision 
policies, procedures, programs, and practices.”99 Unlike parole, the CDCR has no 
jurisdiction over those released to PCRS.100 Another difference is that a county 
cannot send offenders back to prison if they violate a condition of PCRS.101 Once 
the designated agency revokes a felon’s PCRS, it can impose a maximum 
punishment of jail time of up to 180 days.102 Alternatively, it can impose various 
forms of lesser “community-based punishment.”103 The legislature expects that 
the creation of PCRS will reduce the recidivism rate and increase public safety.104 
The PCRS portion of Realignment affirms this belief in stating that the old 
system of “[reincarcerating] parolees for technical violations do[es] not result in 
increased public safety.”105 With more than half of all inmate admissions into 
CDCR prisons in 2010 being parole violators returned to custody,106 the PCRS 
aspects of Realignment’s reform will also likely lead to a marked decrease in the 
prison population as many would-be parole offenders under the old system are 
dealt with locally. 
3.  The Increased Use of Good Behavior Time Credits 
An additional change to California’s sentencing law is that almost everyone 
sentenced to county jail, for either a county jail felony or a PCRS violation, shall 
receive credit for four days of sentence time served for every two actual days of 
time spent in conformity with the jail’s rules and regulations.107 Under this 
provision, many eligible inmates will have their sentence times cut in half, as 
long as they do not behave poorly while incarcerated.108 This expands 
 
95. PENAL § 3451. 
96. Id. § 3453. 
97. BYERS, supra note 16, at 19 (“Persons on (PRCS) are supervised by a designated county 
agency . . . .”). 
98. All counties have designated their probation departments to serve this function. Id. at 22. 
99. PENAL § 3451(a). 
100. Id. § 3457. 
101. Id. § 3458. 
102. Id. § 3455(c). 
103. Id. § 3450(b)(8) (listing some examples of approved methods of “community-based punishment”). 
See Part III.A.4, infra, for further discussion regarding community-based punishments. 
104. PENAL § 3450(b)(1)–(5). 
105. Id. § 3450(b)(3). 
106. CDCR YEAR AT A GLANCE, supra note 89, at 16. 
107. PENAL § 4019. 
108. BYERS, supra note 16, at 79. 
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California’s prior conduct credit law of counting every four actual days of 
incarceration as six.109 
The court in Coleman suggested such an expansion in conduct credits as a 
way California could reduce its prison population.110 The court found there to be 
sufficient evidence that moderate sentence reduction tools such as conduct credits 
do not increase recidivism rates or decrease public safety.111 The legislature has 
followed the Coleman court’s recommendation by offering expanded credits to 
those in county jails.112 This extension of credits may not lead to a noticeable 
decrease in prison population compared to other Realignment provisions because 
it does not expand good time credits for state prison inmates.113 However, it does 
reduce the confinement time of most county jail felons, which helps relieve the 
burden on county jail facilities that Realignment otherwise creates through its 
increased dependence on their use.114 
4. An Increased Focus on Incarceration Alternatives and  Other 
“Community-Based Punishments” 
One of Realignment’s most significant advances is its series of suggested 
practices. Several sections of the law contain a list of “community-based 
punishments.”115 These punishments consist of “evidence-based correctional 
sanctions and programming encompassing a range of custodial and noncustodial 
responses to criminal or noncompliant offender activity.”116 Among the examples 
of such practices are home detention and monitoring, “mandatory random drug 
testing,” work release programs, “substance abuse treatment programs,” and 
“restorative justice programs such as . . . victim-offender reconciliation.”117 Under 
Realignment, counties are encouraged to integrate these and other similar 
programs into their sentencing options for low-level and PCRS offenders.118 In 
fact, counties can use home detention to punish those convicted of county jail 
felonies in lieu of jail time, with each day spent under house arrest counting as a 
 
109. Id. 
110. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *89 (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009). 
111. Id. at *89–90. 
112. PENAL § 4019. 
113. See id. § 4019(a) (applying conduct credits to various places of incarceration, including jails, but 
not prisons). But see BYERS, supra note 16, at 82 (suggesting that Penal Code section 4019 applies conduct 
credits to nonviolent prison felony offenders when spending time in jail while waiting to be sent to prison). 
114. See BYERS, supra note 16, at 18 (stating that Realignment’s amendment to California Penal Code 
section 4019 will allow for almost all offenders under the statute to receive fifty-percent of their sentence credit 
through good time credits). 
115. PENAL § 17.5(a)(8); id. § 3450(b)(8). 
116. Id. § 17.5(a)(8). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. § 17.5(a)(6); id. § 3450(b)(6). 
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day of incarceration towards the sentence.119 Additionally, counties can impose 
other forms of community-based punishment for low-level crimes and as 
intermediate sanctions for PCRS offenders.120 
Prior to Realignment, several counties, most notably San Francisco County, 
employed several of these alternative, non-incarceration-based punishments with 
great success.121 In 2010, San Francisco County contributed a far smaller 
percentage of inmates to the state prison population than any similar-sized 
county.122 Additionally, “[t]he city’s larger than average decline in crime during 
the past decade indicates local non-incarceration and alternative policies for non-
serious offenders are effective.”123 By giving counties latitude to use alternative 
punishment programs empirically proven to work, Realignment gives counties 
the tools they need to meet the legislature’s goals.124 
B.  What Realignment Gets Right: The Use and Promotion of  Proven Recidivism 
and Cost-Reduction Techniques 
The changes brought by Realignment benefit California’s sentencing regime 
by giving justice officials more tools in handling most felony offenders.125 By 
diverting those with low-level felony convictions or post-release technical 
violations away from state prison, California’s lawmakers recognize the 
undesirability of sentencing laws that treat all felony offenders alike by sending 
them all to the same institutions.126 In the years leading up to Realignment, many 
experts decried California’s prisons as “crime schools,” where low-level 
offenders, forced to commingle with more serious offenders, came back into 
society more dangerous and more likely to reoffend.127 By separating low-level 
offenders from the higher-risk inmate population, California mitigates this 
 
119. Id. § 1203.016. 
120. Id. § 17.5(a)(8); id. § 3450(b)(8). 
121. See CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AB 109: CRIMINAL JUSTICE REALIGNMENT & 
REFORM 7 (2011), available at http://www.cjcj.org/files/AB_109_Reform_Conference_Handout.pdf (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that counties that serve their low-level offenders locally, in part 
through the use of alternatives to imprisonment, save the state nearly $750 million per year). 
122. CDCR YEAR AT A GLANCE, supra note 89, at 18 (stating that San Francisco County contributed 0.9 
percent to the prison population, while Sacramento and Fresno Counties respectively contributed 4.7 and 2.9 
percent). 
123. CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 121, at 3. 
124. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
125. See supra Part III.A (discussing the flexibility in sentencing under Realignment). 
126. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(3) (West Supp. 2012) (“Criminal justice policies that rely on 
building and operating more prisons to address community safety concerns are not sustainable, and will not 
result in improved public safety.”). 
127. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL 2430820, at *86 
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (restating the testimony of several criminology experts claiming California’s 
overcrowded prisons to be “criminogenic”). 
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problem by cutting off a known contributor to recidivism.128 This change will 
contribute to Realignment’s goals of reducing recidivism and increasing public 
safety, while also leading to a decrease in prison population.129 
The expansion of earned time credits for county jail inmates will contribute 
to the goal of cost reduction without leading to a decrease in public safety.130 
Some experts state that “a moderate reduction in an inmate’s length of stay in 
[confinement will] not affect the deterrence value of imprisonment.”131 A study of 
several states found that the use of good time credits does not lead to an increase 
in recidivism.132 Several states actually saw recidivism drop after 
implementation.133 By releasing low-risk offenders earlier, the states “reduce[d] 
the[ir] corrections budget burden . . . allow[ing] funds saved to be invested in 
programs that reduce recidivism and help build safe communities.”134 California’s 
counties should expect similar savings, thus giving them more resources to 
implement the community-based punishments encouraged by the legislature. 
The largest factor in Realignment’s potential success lies in the sentencing 
flexibility given to county justice officials through the promotion of community-
based punishment alternatives.135 The legislature has given counties 
“unprecedented discretion in deciding how to best invest [their] realignment 
[funds],” encouraging them to provide empirically proven programs for low-risk 
offenders.136 Counties are not required to use any of these programs; however, 
placing this discretion in their hands improves chances of success, as studies 
show “that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to crime.”137 By encouraging the 
use of sentencing options beyond incarceration, Realignment lays the 
groundwork for a sentencing system that may meet the State’s goals of 
recidivism and cost reduction, while maintaining public safety. 
 
128. See PENAL § 17.5(a)(5) (stating that this change “will improve public safety outcomes among adult 
felons and facilitate their reintegration back into society”). 
129. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1943–44 (2011) (stating that Realignment’s reduction of 
prisoners through the shift of low-level offenders to county custody supports conclusion that “the prison 
population can be reduced in a manner calculated to avoid an undue negative effect on public safety”). 
130. ALLISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CUTTING CORRECTIONS 
COSTS: EARNED TIME POLICIES FOR STATE PRISONERS 4 (2009), available at http://www.ncsl.org/ 
documents/cj/Earned_time_report.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
131. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *89. 
132. LAWRENCE, supra note 130, at 3. 
133. Id. at 1. 
134. Id. at 4. 
135. Roger K. Warren, Viewpoints: Realignment Can Boost Public Safety, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 13, 
2011), http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/realignmentpublicsafety.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
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IV. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD: WHAT STANDS IN THE WAY OF A SUCCESSFUL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF REALIGNMENT 
A number of the changes Realignment makes to California’s sentencing 
scheme will achieve the legislature’s goals of reductions in cost, incarceration, 
and recidivism.138 However, as formulated, Realignment also creates several 
challenges that the counties must overcome to better facilitate the achievement of 
the new law’s goals. This Part discusses some of these challenges. Part A 
discusses the challenge associated with the unprecedented shift of inmates from 
state to local supervision and how Realignment’s current financing scheme 
exacerbates this challenge. Part B discusses the political challenges created by 
the method Realignment uses to delegate decision-making to the counties. 
A.  From Overcrowded Prisons to Overcrowded Jails 
Although untested, Realignment stands a far better chance of achieving the 
goals of cost and recidivism reduction than the prior system, which sent all 
felony offenders and parole offenders to prison, and drove up costs and 
recidivism rates.139 Early reports suggest that Realignment is reducing the State’s 
prison population in time to meet the court mandate.140 However, this new system 
of punishment may create new problems as California incorporates it into the 
current legal and political framework.141 Chief among the concerns is that 
Realignment will shift many of the current problems associated with 
overcrowding from California state prisons to county jails, which are far less 
equipped to handle such an influx.142 Many counties do not have enough jail beds 
 
138. See supra Part III (discussing how several of Realignment’s changes, such as the use of county jail 
felonies and encouragement of alternatives to incarceration, will fulfill the legislature’s stated goals). 
139. Id. 
140. See Rina Palta, California’s Prison Population Drops, KALW NEWS (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:45 AM), 
http://informant.kalwnews.org/2012/01/californias-prison-population-drops (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (reporting that, since its implementation, Realignment has reduced prison population by about 8,000 
inmates, nearly hitting the reduction goal for the end of 2011 that will keep the State on track in meeting the 
court mandate). 
141. See Melissa Corker, AB 109 Brings New Inmates and New Challenges to County Jail, 
SACRAMENTO PRESS (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:45 PM), http://www.sacramentopress.com/headline/58003/AB_ 
109_brings_new_inmates_and_new_challenges_to_county_jail (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(stating that counties are not being provided with enough funding in order to properly carry out Realignment’s 
changes to the law and that the savings from Realignment will not reach the local level before the influx of 
inmates will). 
142. See David Greenwald, Advocates Express Concern that County AB 109 Plan Lacks Funding for 
Mental Health Services, YOLO JUDICIAL WATCH (Oct. 26, 2011, 6:48 AM), http://davisvanguard.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4791:advocates-express-concern-that-county-ab-109-plan-
lacks-funding-for-mental-health-services&Itemid=100 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting on 
the lack of Realignment funding allocated to adequately maintain mental health care services for mentally ill jail 
inmates in Yolo County); Corker, supra note 141 (reporting that there is no room in Sacramento County’s jails 
or enough money to accommodate Realignment’s initial influx of inmates). 
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to hold the projected influx of new inmates.143 While Realignment allows 
counties to authorize their correctional administrators to offer alternative 
punishments,144 many counties are using their Realignment funding to build more 
jail space.145 
Shortly after the passage of AB 109, California’s legislature amended a 2007 
bill that provides over seven-billion dollars in state funding for the construction 
of new prisons and jails146 to make the construction money more accessible to 
counties for building new jail space.147 The amendment reduces the percentage of 
the construction costs that a county must pay out of its own funds from twenty-
five percent to ten percent, or less for some smaller counties.148 Additionally, it 
gives preference to funding jail space development in counties that traditionally 
have committed the largest number of offenders to prison.149 Taken together, 
these provisions give counties an incentive to return to the pre-Realignment, pro-
incarceration policies that led to the prison overpopulation problem in the first 
place.150 State funding currently available to the counties for implementing their 
Realignment strategies may not continue in the future.151 Nonetheless, the extra 
funding for building jails has given CCPs the incentive to build more jail cells, 
rather than using funding for proven alternatives.152 
This funding formula also penalizes those counties that choose to use their 
funds to implement alternatives to incarceration over jail expansion by 
withholding potential funding for these programs.153 In doing so, it harms 
Realignment’s dual goals of cost and recidivism reduction by penalizing counties 
 
143. See Toni McAllister, Early Release Possible for Inmates as Local Jails Fill, LAKE ELSINORE-
WILDOMAR PATCH (Jan. 7, 2012), http://lakeelsinore-wildomar.patch.com/articles/early-release-possible-for-
inmates-as-local-jails-fill (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting the Sheriff’s Department as stating 
that they will be unable to retain all of the incoming inmates because it does not have enough jail beds). 
144. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.016 (West Supp. 2012). 
145. See Emily Harris, Op-Ed, Is Realignment an Opportunity? If so, Let’s Not Waste It on Building 
Costly Jail Beds, CAPITOL WEEKLY (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.capitolweekly.net/article.php? 
xid=105peby61sh96gg (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that thirty-four of California’s fifty-
eight counties indicate plans for jail space expansions, while only a few counties, such as San Francisco, have 
decided not to expand their jails). 
146. AB 900, 2007 Leg., 2007–2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007). 
147. AB 94, 2011 Leg., 2011–2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. See Harris, supra note 145 (arguing that the appropriation of Realignment funding in such a way 
will do little more than perpetuate the cycle of offenders in California’s penal system, and will do so at a heavy 
financial cost to the State). 
151. See CONTRA COSTA CNTY., 2011 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET (2011), available 
at http://www.furtherthework.com/CoCo_Realignment_Fact_Sheet.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (stating that adequate state revenue streams to the counties, though promised, are not yet guaranteed). 
152. See Harris, supra note 145 (“34 of California’s 58 counties have indicated plans for expensive jail 
expansions to date, while leaving programs and services as an ‘unaffordable’ afterthought.”). 
153. Id.; Palta, supra note 140. 
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that decide to implement proven crime-reducing punishment alternatives that 
save the State hundreds of millions of dollars every year.154 
Even assuming there will be sufficient funding to build enough extra jail 
space to hold the influx of new inmates, the earliest date any of this jail 
expansion is set to occur is mid-2013,155 around the time California must meet its 
full court-ordered population reduction.156 With the state-backed financial 
incentives leading many of the most crime-heavy counties to build more jail 
space that will not be ready soon enough,157 the inevitable result is in an influx of 
inmates for whom there is no space.158 This reality may encourage counties to 
resort to jail-population reduction techniques, such as releasing more arraigned 
offenders on their own recognizance, rather than relying on bail.159 However, with 
a large portion of state funding supporting counties in incarcerating county jail 
felons, local justice officials have little incentive to use community-based 
sentencing alternatives, thus encouraging the legacy of mass incarceration that 
has proven itself untenable.160 
 
154. See CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 121, at 7 (stating that “self-reliant” 
counties that have the lowest incarceration rates and employ the most incarceration alternatives, most notably 
San Francisco and Contra Costa counties, save California approximately $746 million dollars per year by 
serving their offenders locally). 
155. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., AB 900 CONSTRUCTION UPDATE 6 (2011), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/FPCM/docs/AB-900-Construction-Update-Fact-Sheet.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (listing all the active jail construction programs under AB 900 funding). 
156. The Court’s order states that California must meet the reduction to 137.5 percent design capacity by 
June 27, 2013. 2011 Public Safety Realignment: The Cornerstone of California’s Solution to Reduce 
Overcrowding, Costs, and Recidivism, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ 
realignment/index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
157. Harris, supra note 145 (stating that almost all of the 34 counties seeking to expand their jail space 
are vying for the state funds available under the amended AB 900 allotment). 
158. See Scott Weber, Counties Getting More State Prisoners than Expected, NBC L.A. (Nov. 16, 2011, 
5:57 PM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Counties-Getting-More-State-Prisoners-Than-Expected-
134001758.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that many counties are receiving higher 
influxes of inmates than expected and, at this rate, the jails in Orange and Riverside counties will be full by 
early 2012). 
159. W. DAVID BALL, TOUGH ON CRIME (ON THE STATE’S DIME): HOW VIOLENT CRIME DOES NOT 
DRIVE CALIFORNIA COUNTIES’ INCARCERATION RATES—AND WHY IT SHOULD 53, 76 (2012), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/162 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
160. See Rina Palta, California Invests Millions in New Jails to Deal with Overcrowding, KALW NEWS, 
(Nov. 9, 2011, 5:32 PM), http://kalwnews.org/audio/2011/11/09/california-invests-millions-new-jails-deal-
overcrowding_1438449.html [hereinafter California Invests Millions in New Jails] (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (arguing that state funding exclusively for jail construction will continue California’s legacy of 
mass incarceration, potentially leading to as many as fifty-eight Plata-Coleman cases). 
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B.  A Built-In Opportunity for Local Politics to Undermine the Legislature’s 
Goals 
The Realignment legislation gives local justice officials discretion in 
handling the offenders who fall under their purview.161 This can prove to be a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, a county may tailor how it handles 
offenders through evidence-based programs that fit the needs of the 
community.162 However, county officials can also use this discretion to perpetuate 
California’s pattern of incarceration by locking up many county jail-eligible 
offenders instead of investing in programs that would better benefit offenders and 
the community as a whole.163 
High-ranking officials in several counties claim that Realignment’s shift to 
community-centric corrections will do little more than lead to a crime wave 
across the state.164 Under Realignment, many of these officials are members of 
the CCP executive committees, assigned to devise their counties’ plans for 
implementing the new law.165 Upon creation of a plan, Realignment requires a 
committee to present it to the county board of supervisors for approval.166 But 
because a four-fifths vote by the board is required to halt the plan’s 
implementation,167 it is difficult for opponents to defeat these plans. 
Publicly elected county officials hold the majority of the positions on the 
CCP executive committees and the entirety of every county board.168 A county’s 
residents control the outcomes of these elections; candidates for offices such as 
district attorney, sheriff, and superior court judge have no need to campaign 
statewide.169 Overall, a majority of California voters see the prisoner release order 
and California’s Realignment plan as a major political issue.170 A Field Poll 
 
161. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.016 (West Supp. 2012) (authorizing counties to commit county jail 
felons to home detention, electronic monitoring, and other alternatives in lieu of jail time). 
162. See Marissa Lagos, Counties Dilemma: How to Use Funds for Inmates, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 5, 
2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/05/MNDF1M6CVP.DTL (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that several Bay Area counties are using their funding to send low-level 
offenders to rehabilitation programs with much success). 
163. Id. 
164. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 25 (reporting that Los Angeles’s District Attorney and Sheriff both 
predict a crime wave to occur in their county because of Realignment). 
165. A county’s CCP executive committee must consist of the chief probation officer, a chief of police, 
the Sheriff, the District Attorney, the Public Defender, the Presiding Judge of the superior court, and one other 
department representative. PENAL § 1230.1(b). 
166. Id. § 1230.1(c). 
167. Id. 
168. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 1(b) (declaring that all counties are to have an elected sheriff, 
district attorney, and governing body). 
169. BALL, supra note 159, at 7–8. 
170. MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, VOTERS CONSIDER SUPREME COURT’S RULING THAT 
CALIFORNIA REDUCE ITS PRISON POPULATION SERIOUS 1 (2011), available at http://www.field.com/ 
fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2376.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). In this non-partisan Field Poll 
survey, the authors find that seventy-nine percent of polled California voters consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
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survey of California voters finds that a slight majority of California voters favor 
Realignment’s major changes.171 The Poll finds that, while sixty percent of 
Democrats support the plan, Republican voters overall believe that Realignment 
is a bad idea, with nearly half opposing it and only thirty-eight percent in favor.172 
This suggests that in counties that are majority Republican, and counties that are 
close to 50/50 in their political makeup, are more likely to vote for local officials 
who oppose Realignment’s changes and are likely to ignore community-based 
punishments.173 Additionally, voters are concerned with the budgetary issues 
associated with Realignment, with many opposed to the increased use of county 
funds to pay for it.174 
Moreover, sensationalist news stories—reporting almost daily on the early 
release of sex offenders and other alleged injustices created because of 
Realignment’s sentencing changes—may increase voters’ concerns about public 
safety.175 In fact, officials in some counties are already using the issue as a 
campaign platform, telling voters that Realignment will place their communities’ 
safety in jeopardy.176 
The public perception of Realignment in many counties revolves around the 
issues of public safety and county finances.177 Because state financial incentives 
are freeing up large amounts of money exclusively for counties to build new 
 
mandate to have a serious impact and that fifty-one percent of voters support the Realignment plan, while thirty-
seven percent oppose it. Id. 
171. Id. at 2. 
172. Id. 
173. See California Invests Millions in New Jails, supra note 160 (stating that Realignment has not been 
well received in many parts of the state and that Republican elected officials from these counties are trying to 
exert political pressure on the issue by claiming that Realignment’s changes will lead to the early release of 
violent felons). 
174. DICAMELO & FIELD, supra note 170, at 4 (reporting that fifty-nine percent of California voters are 
against raising new taxes to fund counties’ extra costs in handling the inmate transfer). 
175. See, e.g., Jim Shultz, 6 Freed Despite Sex Crimes, REDDING.COM (Oct. 13, 2011, 11:46 PM), 
http://www.redding.com/news/2011/oct/13/6-freed-despite-sex-crimes/ (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (reporting that six sex offenders who violated parole terms were quickly released from jail under 
Realignment and that such light punishment could be “a harbinger of dire things to come”); Public Safety 
Realignment Plan Causing Early Release of Criminals, CENTRAL COAST NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:28 PM), 
http://www.kionrightnow.com/story/16055120/public-safety-realignment-plan-causing-early-release-of-inmates 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that Kern County, in one week, released over fifty parole 
violators early, including thieves); Joe Matthews, Lindsay Lohan: Beneficiary of California’s Dysfunction, NBC 
L.A. (Nov. 8, 2011, 12:48 PM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/blogs/prop-zero/Lindsay-Lohan-Gov-Jerry-
Brown-Realignment-133356448.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that, because of 
Realignment, Lindsay Lohan spent only five hours in jail instead of the thirty days she was sentenced to). 
176. See, e.g., Toni McAllister, Early Release Possible for Inmates as Local Jails Fill, LAKE ELSINORE-
WILDOMAR PATCH (Jan. 7, 2012), http://lakeelsinore-wildomar.patch.com/articles/early-release-possible-for-
inmates-as-local-jails-fill (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that, when announcing his bid for 
a Riverside County supervisor seat, State Assemblyman Kevin Jefferies decried AB 109 as harmful to public 
safety). 
177. DICAMELO & FIELD, supra note 170, at 1–2, 4. 
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jails,178 the option of making jail construction and further incarceration of 
offenders a central part of a county’s Realignment plan becomes an attractive 
option for CCP and county board members looking for reelection.179 The promise 
of new jail space, mostly funded by the State, also appeals to local voters. With 
such incentives in place, instead of utilizing Realignment’s changes to implement 
proven recidivism-reducing programs, many counties may continue on the path 
of mass incarceration, this time using jails instead of prisons.180 Realignment 
provides many of the tools for California’s counties to remedy the state’s 
problems with high recidivism and criminal justice spending.181 However, to 
maximize potential to achieve California’s penological goals, Realignment will 
need state-backed incentives that encourage counties to pursue proven 
incarceration alternatives for incoming offenders.182 Realignment’s current 
financial and political incentives encourage a focus on incarceration, leading to 
county policies that do little to decrease California’s recidivism problem and the 
high costs associated with incarceration.183 
V. A SIMPLE FIX: A DIFFERENT FINANCIAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURE AND AN 
ACTUARIAL RISK/NEEDS INSTRUMENT 
Although Realignment’s current method of delegating funding and decision-
making to the counties in some ways frustrates the main thrust of the law,184 a 
couple of minor changes and additions to California’s sentencing law and policy 
could reduce the impact of these burdens. This Part suggests minor reforms, 
made at little-to-no cost to the State, furthering Realignment’s stated goals of 
cutting the recidivism rate, reducing costs, and improving public safety.185 
Realignment’s creation of CCPs in each county to implement its sentencing 
plan essentially creates fifty-eight separate sentencing commissions in 
 
178. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the state funding available to counties for jail construction). 
179. See California Invests Millions in New Jails, supra note 160 (explaining that Republican party 
plans on a platform of “attacking the governor for what they say is threatening public safety and dumping the 
responsibility for prison overcrowding on the counties”). 
180. See MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CAN CALIFORNIA COUNTY JAILS 
ABSORB LOW-LEVEL STATE PRISONERS? 4–5 (2011), available at http://www.cjcj.org/files/Can_ 
California_County_Jails_Absorb_Low-Level_State_Prisoners.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(stating that many low-level offenders respond better to community treatment and supervision programs 
compared to incarceration). 
181. See supra Part III.B (discussing the potential benefits Realignment’s changes have over 
California’s prior sentencing law). 
182. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
183. See How Much Does It Cost to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison?, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/laoapp/laomenus/sections/crim_justice/6_cj_inmatecost.aspx?catid=3 (last visited Mar. 
23, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[In 2009], [i]t cost an average of about $47,000 per year to 
incarcerate an inmate in prison in California.”). 
184. See supra Part IV (highlighting the inherent issues of having fifty-eight individual CCPs). 
185. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (West Supp. 2012). 
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California.186 The problem with this is the non-uniformity that it creates amongst 
the counties.187 Some CCPs use Realignment’s financial incentives by funding jail 
development, while others are trying to integrate further community-based 
sentencing options.188 Counties integrating these alternatives subsidize those who 
chose to develop jails, by saving the State money and not pursuing AB 900 jail 
development funds.189 The problem that perpetuates this situation is that subsidies 
are not available for counties that choose to invest further in proven evidence-
based practices and programs with respect to county jail felons.190 However, a 
shift in how the state allocates the currently available criminal justice funding to 
the counties can ameliorate this problem. 
A.  A Change in the Distribution of State Subsidies 
California’s largest subsidy to counties for implementing Realignment 
focuses exclusively on creating more space for costly incarceration.191 With the 
state giving counties discretion in which programs and services to place their 
criminal justice dollars behind, the State should reevaluate its current distribution 
of the limited subsidy money for the counties with the goal of favoring programs 
proven to reduce crime and costs.192 A redistribution plan needs to encourage 
counties to use programs that show measurable outcomes in reaching this goal.193 
The State could do this by increasing the state funds available to successful 
counties and by reducing the required proportion of contributions that those 
counties must pay out of their own funds.194 
In determining how to distribute funds to encourage counties to invest in 
proven sentencing alternatives for low-level offenders, the State could model its 
structure on California’s 2009 Community Corrections Performance Incentives 
Act (Act).195 The Act “provides state funding to county probation departments to 
fund local evidence-based probation supervision practices for the purpose of 
 
186. Weisberg, supra note 17, at 6. 
187. Id. (“California could have had just one [sentencing commission], and it could have made that 
commission a responsible and well-coordinated branch of state government. Perhaps recklessly, it chose this 
other path.”). 
188. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
189. See CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 121, at 1 (“[L]ocally self-reliant counties 
have been penalized in the funding formula for allocation of realignment money and will have to develop new 
innovative ways to expand their existing programs to encompass this new population; while state-dependent 
counties are faced with a pivotal decision—to embrace best practices or perpetuate the mistakes of a broken 
prison system at a local level.”). 
190. Warren, supra note 135. 
191. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 15820.911, 15820.917 (West Supp. 2012). 
192. Warren, supra note 135. 
193. BALL, supra note 159, at 71. 
194. Id. 
195. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1228 (West Supp. 2012). 
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reducing recidivism and revocations among felony probationers.”196 Under the 
Act, the State grants subsidy funds to counties based on a county’s performance 
in reducing felony-probationer failure rates.197 Subsidy funds for a given county 
are calculated by determining an estimated number of probationers successfully 
prevented from being sent to prison multiplied by either forty or forty-five 
percent of the costs to the State in sending a probationer to prison.198 The Act also 
provides additional performance-based grants to counties that reduce their 
probationer failure rates, giving those counties an extra five percent of the funds 
the state saves as a result.199 
In its first year, this subsidy program has “resulted in a 23 percent reduction 
in prison commitments [among felony-probationers], saving the state almost 
$180 million in state corrections costs.”200 During the first year, the State only 
invested $45 million to achieve this result.201 These savings make the program 
self-sustaining.202 For the second year, the state reinvested nearly $90 million of 
the savings to further the gains already made.203 Through these savings and 
lowered failure rates, this program has made great strides towards achieving the 
legislature’s Realignment goals in the probation arena.204 In fact, many CCPs 
have begun focusing on alternative evidence-based practices in handling 
probationers in an attempt to increase performance-based funding under the 
Act.205 
Setting up a subsidy plan similar to the 2009 Act encourages county agencies 
to develop practices and programs that are the most effective for their particular 
communities.206 Additionally, the Act does not penalize those counties that use 
their funds to experiment with innovative probation practices and policies and 
fail to achieve their expected results.207 The largest part of its grant payment is 
 
196. Warren, supra note 135. 
197. PENAL § 1233.4. 
198. Id. § 1233.3. 
199. Id. § 1233.4. 
200. Warren, supra note 135; see also CAL. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SB 678 YEAR 1 REPORT 3 
(2011) (listing the yearly probation failure rates since 2006, showing a 23% decline). 
201. CAL. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 200, at 2. 
202. See id. at 1–3 (stating that the state will redistribute about half of the savings to the successful 
counties to continue their proven probation practices). 
203. EDMUND G. BROWN JR., 2011–12 CALIFORNIA STATE BUDGET 36 (2011), available at 
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/CorrectionsandRehabilitation.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
204. See supra text accompanying note 78 (stating the major goals the legislature hopes to achieve 
through Realignment). 
205. See, e.g., DEL NORTE CNTY., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT 6–11 (2011) (stating all the 
evidence-based measures Del Norte County’s probation department is utilizing to reduce probationer failure 
rates). 
206. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1233.4(d) (West Supp. 2012) (granting extra funding to those counties 
that are able to reduce their probation failure rates to less than half of the statewide average in a given year). 
207. Id. § 1233.3. 
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based on the gains the county made, regardless of how small.208 If the State were 
to implement a similar incentive structure to encourage counties to use 
alternative sentencing practices for county jail-eligible felons and those on 
PCRS, CCPs will be more likely to choose to develop further proven alternatives 
to incarceration in their implementation plans. As a result, there will likely be a 
drop in the statewide recidivism rate and offender management costs. 
In developing a subsidy program, the State could expand the permitted uses 
under its current prison construction subsidy to include funding for the 
implementation of the legislature’s listed “community-based punishments”209 and 
other evidence-based sentencing practices. Like under the 2009 Act, the State 
could base its appropriation of the performance-based funds to a given county by 
determining a county’s “failure rate,” those offenders who reoffend or violate 
their PCRS conditions, and judging it against the statewide average.210 Based on 
this rate, the State could determine the amount of money that a county is saving 
the state and give back a percentage.211 Additionally, the State could provide 
some of these savings to less-successful counties by offering subsidy funds for 
the implementation of specific evidence-based sentencing practices that a county 
is not currently adopting.212 About $125 million is already available in unneeded 
prison construction money under AB 900 to act as part of a seed fund for such a 
subsidy program.213 
The State would need to frame the subsidy in terms of money saved on 
inmate costs for counties in order to build counties’ political will to not only pass 
such a program through the legislature, but also for them to be more willing to 
participate in it.214 This tactic proved successful for the 2009 Act, which passed 
unanimously.215 However, the semi-voluntary nature of such a subsidy program 
does not guarantee that it will persuade all CCPs to seek the state funding for 
using alternative sentencing practices; they may simply continue to seek funding 
for jail expansion, believing that continuing to incarcerate low-level offenders is 
the most effective way to promote public safety.216 Therefore, in order to make 
 
208. Id.  
209. Id. § 17.5(a)(8). 
210. Id. § 1233. 
211. See id. § 1233.3 (setting out a tiered program where a county that saves the state money is entitled 
to a payment by the state based on a certain percentage of the funds the county saves the state in a given year). 
212. The State already provides similar funding to high achieving counties under the 2009 Act for the 
specific purpose of bolstering evidence-based probation practices designed to reduce recidivism. Id. § 
1233.4(c). 
213. EDMUND G. BROWN JR., 2012–13 CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 127 (2011), 
available at http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
214. BALL, supra note 159, at 76. 
215. Warren, supra note 135. 
216. See California Prison Reduction Plans Are an ‘Unfunded Mandate,’ Says Police Chief Beck, 
HUFFINGTON POST L.A. (Oct. 10, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/04/california-
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sure counties are more disposed to pursue the subsidy in an effective manner, the 
State needs to guide them to the conclusion that jail time is not always an 
effective solution to meeting the goal of handling low-level offenders in a 
socially productive and cost-effective manner. 
B.  Adoption of an Actuarial Risk Assessment Instrument in Sentencing of 
Lower-Level Offenders 
One way to guide county officials towards corrections practices that best 
meet Realignment’s three goals of public safety, recidivism reduction, and cost 
reduction, would be to mandate statewide use of a risk/needs assessment (RNA) 
instrument at sentencing. A judge can use an RNA instrument to help determine 
the appropriate sentence for an individual low-level offender based on 
determinations premised on three key principles: the risk the offender poses to 
the public, the offender’s needs, and the probability that the offender will benefit 
from a particular punishment or program.217 An effective RNA instrument would 
account for personal characteristics empirically proven to have a bearing on the 
offender’s likelihood to reoffend.218 Additionally, it would look at those attributes 
and determine whether incarceration or a community-based sentencing 
alternative would better serve the offender and the community.219 
The probation departments in several California counties have already 
successfully used such an instrument in handling offenders on probation or 
PCRS.220 However, such an assessment system would not be effective for making 
sentencing determinations by a court, as there are more interests at play that are 
not present in other criminal justice decisions.221 “Each state and local jurisdiction 
 
prison-reduction_n_994500.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[L.A. Police] Chief Beck called the 
state’s prison reduction plan an ‘unfunded mandate’ that would result in longer emergency response times and 
unsafe communities for Angelenos, as he would have to divert 150 police officers to probation duties instead of 
street patrol.”). 
217. PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS 
ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING 4–8 (2011), available at http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/ 
Services%20and%20Experts/Areas%20of%20expertise/Sentencing%20Probation/RNA%20Guide%20Final.ash
x (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
218. See id. at 5 (stating some personal attributes that have proven to be indicative of an offender’s 
propensity to reoffend). 
219. Id. at 6 (“[An RNA instrument] assess[es] an offender’s risk of reoffending, matching supervision 
and treatment to the offender’s risk level, and targeting the offender’s criminogenic needs or dynamic risk 
factors with the social learning and cognitive-behavioral programs most likely to effect change in the offender’s 
behavior given specific offender characteristics.”). 
220. See, e.g., S.F. CNTY. COMMUNITY CORR. P’SHIP, CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC 
SAFETY REALIGNMENT & POST RELEASE CMTY. SUPERVISION 2011 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 15–16 (2011) 
(describing the risk/needs assessment that the probation department must undertake); DEL NORTE CNTY., supra 
note 205, at 7 (stating that the use of a risk/needs assessment instrument has helped to reduce probationer failure 
rates, leading to a performance-based subsidy of $169,047 from the state for this small county). 
221. CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 1 (“The use of RNA information at sentencing is somewhat more 
complex than for other criminal justice decisions because the sentencing decision has multiple purposes— 
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will [need to] determine its own best path.”222 Nevertheless, without a mandatory 
uniform assessment instrument in place for all county jail-eligible offenders, 
different counties will continue to vary widely in achieving recidivism reduction, 
with the poorer performing counties costing the rest of the state millions.223 
Employing an RNA instrument would reduce recidivism and costs by 
helping guide criminal justice officials towards the most effective outcome for 
each individual offender.224 However, what offender characteristics would an 
effective instrument take into account? Looking to Virginia, the first state to 
implement RNA into sentencing determinations, is informative in figuring out 
which factors are effective.225 
1.  Determining Risk: Virginia’s Actuarial Assessment Instrument 
In 2002, Virginia implemented a risk-based sentencing evaluation system 
that requires trial courts to use a risk assessment report when evaluating 
nonviolent offenders to determine the appropriate sentence.226 The Virginia risk 
assessment instrument relies on several statistically relevant factors to “develop[] 
profiles, or composites, based on overall group outcomes.”227 The instrument 
creates a profile of an offender based on individual characteristics to determine 
whether they fall into a “high-risk” category, to determine whether they are more 
likely to reoffend.228 A judge can then use the “recommendation” that the data 
gives to aid in making a sentencing determination.229 
Among the factors considered by a Virginia state court in determining the 
appropriate sentence are an offender’s age, prior criminal history, educational 
level, marriage status, employment status, gender, and the nature of and facts 
surrounding the current conviction.230 The court gives a certain weight to each 
factor in its determination, with some factors such as age, gender, criminal 
history, and the nature of the current offense, weighing more heavily.231 Based on 
the overall score, the instrument places an offender into a categorical grouping; 
for example, those placed into a particular group being statistically as likely to 
 
punishment, incapacitation, rehabilitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence, and restitution . . . .”). 
222. Id. at 37. 
223. CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 121, at 7. 
224. See generally CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 7–8 (explaining how using RNA criteria at 
sentencing aids in making a sentencing conclusion that will lead to the most effective outcome for the offender 
and the community). 
225. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 28, at 113. 
226. See generally id. (describing Virginia’s risk assessment instrument). 
227. Id. at 23. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 27. 
230. Id.  
231. Id. 
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reoffend as others are within the same group.232 This instrument has proven 
successful. Within the past decade, Virginia’s prison population has shrunk 
drastically because of the increased use of shorter sentences and alternatives to 
incarceration, leaving newly built prisons empty of inmates.233 
The use of statistically determinative factors of risk similar to those in 
Virginia’s instrument could prove useful in California as a complement to the 
subsidy discussed above. It would assist those in charge of local sentencing by 
showing them an offender’s likely risk to the community, aiding judges and other 
justice officials in realizing that incarceration for some low-level offenders might 
not prove to be the most socially productive or cost-effective method of 
intervention.234 
However, there is some backlash regarding Virginia’s use of certain criteria, 
such as age and gender, in imposing differing penalties for different persons 
convicted of the same offense.235 There are claims that certain factors may violate 
equal protection;236 however, courts have yet to address this potential issue, likely 
because the State has enough of a compelling interest in public safety.237 Since 
experts generally consider these factors highly relevant to determining the risk 
that an offender will reoffend,238 the state may justify their use on public safety 
grounds.239 
Nevertheless, there are more pressing flaws in Virginia’s instrument: judges 
use it only to assess an offender’s risk to public safety and it does not recommend 
specific alternative punishments.240 Limiting such an instrument only to the 
functions that Virginia uses it for would prove problematic to California because 
Virginia did not design it to assess the needs of individual offenders, thus 
 
232. Id. at 29. 
233. Lawrence Hammack, New $105M Va. Prison Remains Empty, ROANOKE TIMES (Jan. 3, 2011), 
http://hamptonroads.com/2011/01/new-105m-va-prison-remains-empty?cid=ltst (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review). 
234. See Warren, supra note 135 (stating that the use of a validated risk assessment tool is more accurate 
in determining the actual risk that an individual offender poses, and their needs, than unguided discretion 
alone). 
235. Emily Bazelon, Sentencing by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2005), available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2005/01/02/magazine/02IDEA.html?pagewanted=1 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
236. Id. See generally BRIAN NETTER, USING GROUP STATISTICS TO SENTENCE INDIVIDUAL 
CRIMINALS: AN ETHICAL AND STATISTICAL CRITIQUE OF THE VIRGINIA RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (2006), 
available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=ylsspps_papers (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that several of Virginia’s assessment factors should not be used 
at sentencing based on ethical grounds). 
237. Bazelon, supra note 235. 
238. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 28, at 27 (listing age, gender, and marital status as the top factors in 
considering the risk a low-level offender poses under the Virginia risk assessment instrument). 
239. See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, 
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 430–32 (2006) (claiming that, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
current jurisprudential framework for equal protection claims, the use of gender, age, and other non-race-based 
factors are permissible for risk assessment purposes). 
240. CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 9. 
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reducing its effectiveness in addressing recidivism.241 Moreover, Virginia has a 
far smaller population than California and its recidivism rate is historically far 
smaller, staying constant at about twenty-nine percent,242 which indicates that 
such a single purpose instrument might be inadequate for California’s more dire 
situation. 
A determination “that [an offender is] ‘high risk’ does not necessarily 
translate to ‘need to incarcerate.’”243 A judge should use an RNA instrument to 
aid in the determination, not supplant it, and the court should consider other 
factors beyond static risk factors in determining what type of punishment will 
result in the most favorable outcome for both the offender and the community.244 
In order to create an instrument suitable to California’s needs, the legislature 
must necessarily consider other factors incorporating the needs of the individual 
low-level offender and the county’s capacity to handle such an offender within 
the community.245 
C. Beyond Risk: Determining Low-Level Offenders’ Needs in Specific 
Communities 
The factors identified in Virginia’s assessment instrument serve as a helpful 
“baseline” for the creation of an instrument that meets California’s goals because 
they are statistically proven to determine the likelihood that an offender will 
reoffend, regardless of geographic location or circumstances.246 However, there is 
no “one-size-fits-all” assessment instrument that will best evaluate any given 
offender in any given community.247 In fact, one of the most important 
determinations for a jurisdiction to make in choosing which factors to incorporate 
into an assessment instrument is what its overall penological goals are, thus 
allowing it to determine how the instrument will play a role in meeting those 
goals.248 Through Realignment’s changes, California’s legislature has already 
stated the goals of reducing recidivism, reducing costs, and improving public 
 
241. Id. 
242. BARON BLAKELY ET AL., VA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT 
ON THE VIRGINIA PRISON REENTRY PROGRAMS 4 (2007), available at http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/ 
research/documents/prisonerrentryinterim.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
243. CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 21. 
244. Id. at 14. 
245. See id. (stating other factors a court should take into account beyond the RNA instrument when 
determining whether community supervision or other alternative sentencing measures would prove superior to 
incarceration). 
246. See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 28, at 27 (listing the risk assessment factors that Virginia’s 
instrument takes into account, many of which are immutable offender characteristics). 
247. See Zachary Dal Pra, In Search of a Risk Instrument, in TOPICS IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS: 
ASSESSMENT ISSUES FOR MANAGERS 9, 9 (2004), available at http://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/ccjr/docs/ 
articles/ticc04_final_complete.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that even if there were a 
comprehensive assessment instrument, it would be too complicated to effectively and efficiently employ). 
248. Id. 
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safety.249 An effective RNA instrument would also need to “assesses dynamic 
factors that can be used to guide treatment decisions and facilitate behavioral 
change” to determine if a non-incarceration intervention would better serve a 
county jail-eligible offender,250 the county’s public safety, and costs. 
With the right factors and the right amount of weight given to each one, an 
effective RNA instrument should be able to help a judge determine not only what 
risk a low-level offender poses, but also what available intervention method will 
best achieve California’s goals.251 One issue, however, in developing a uniform 
instrument for statewide implementation is the differing needs and resources of 
each county.252 While certain factors may hold constant from county to county 
and some sentencing options may be available statewide, not all counties will 
have the same resources to devote to certain types of offenders.253 Additionally, 
some counties may have unique offender populations that local sentencing 
officials need to take into account to get the most predictive value out of an 
assessment.254 By creating a separate CCP for each of California’s fifty-eight 
counties, Realignment gives local policy-makers more say in handling criminal 
sentencing than ever before.255 California’s RNA instrument should reflect this 
shift in policy-making power by giving county-level agencies and officials the 
ability to determine how much weight to give to certain assessment factors and to 
determine whether to insert additional, county-specific factors into the 
assessment. Certain risk-needs factors may carry more weight in assessing what 
type of intervention is right for offenders in one county than they do in other 
counties.256 “[W]hat works in downtown Los Angeles may not work in Napa 
Valley.”257 
For example, studies show that unemployed persons are more likely to 
commit low-level offenses and that those who live in communities with high 
 
249. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (West Supp. 2012). 
250. CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 29. 
251. See id. at 6 (“[A]ssessing an offender’s risk of reoffending, matching supervision and treatment to 
the offender’s risk level, and targeting the offender’s criminogenic needs or dynamic risk factors with the . . . 
programs most likely to effect change in the offender’s behavior given specific offender characteristics . . . is 
associated with the greatest reduction . . . in the recidivism rate.”). 
252. Id. at 14 (“Whether an offender is a good candidate for community supervision is a decision each 
court makes, based in part, on the availability of effective local supervision and treatment resources available to 
address the offender’s specific risk factors.”). 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. See Weisberg, supra note 17, at 6 (“[T]he CCP must be the cost-benefit analyst, information 
manager, and overall administrator over vast portions of the criminal justice system.”). 
256. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 30 (“Given the purpose for and potential judicial 
consequences of using assessment information at sentencing, research must provide evidentiary support that the 
tool can effectively categorize all types of offenders in the local population on which the instrument will be 
used into groups with different probabilities of recidivating.”). 
257. Id. at 32. 
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unemployment rates are even more likely to do so.258 California’s counties have 
widely varying unemployment rates.259 Therefore, while an assessment factor 
based around an offender’s employment status may carry a certain amount of 
weight in determining his likelihood to reoffend in one county, that factor’s 
determinative strength may be entirely different in another.260 Additionally, 
certain counties have offenders with distinctive needs, such as Shasta County, 
which has a high rate of substance-abuse offenses.261 An RNA instrument should 
be able to take into account the availability of resources within a particular 
county to address such an offender in the most effective manner.262 
In order to encourage counties to determine the proper weight to give certain 
factors in the statewide instrument and what additional, local factors to add, a 
portion of state subsidy funding for Realignment implementation should be set 
aside for counties to conduct validation studies. The validation process requires a 
jurisdiction, such as a county, to test out an RNA instrument on a small sampling 
of offenders that is representative of the local population to determine its 
accuracy.263 By giving county officials the ability to build and try an instrument 
for themselves, there is a greater chance of engendering trust in local sentencing 
officials and community members that the instrument is accurate.264 By producing 
greater community trust in the instrument’s accuracy, counties are also more 
likely to “bolster and expand current evidence-based practices” as well as 
“develop local community-based treatment resources in areas of need” based off 
of the data that the instrument’s determinations develop.265 Additionally, counties 
can use this data to help guide how much state and local funding to apply 
 
258. See Steven Raphael & Rudolph Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime, 
44 J.L. & ECON. 259, 271, 280–81 (2001) (stating that a 1 percent drop in the unemployment rate leads to as 
much as a 2.4 percent decrease in the property crime rate and that areas with high unemployment generally have 
much higher crime rates). 
259. LABOR MKT. INFO. DIV., CAL. EMP’T DEV. DEP’T, MONTHLY LABOR FORCE DATA FOR COUNTIES 
FEBRUARY 2012 4 (2012), available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/about_edd/pdf/urate201203.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (reporting the unemployment rate for each county in California, with Colusa County 
having the highest rate at 27.1 percent and Marin County having the lowest rate at 6.6 percent). 
260. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 31 (“[T]he target population(s) on which the [RNA] tool was 
constructed and previously validated may not be representative of the local population; as a result, the tool may 
not retain its predictive validity in the new context.”). 
261. CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 121, at 5. 
262. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 217, at 14. 
The offender’s risk ‘score,’ at the time of sentencing may . . . be a relevant factor but should never 
be determinative in deciding whether the offender can be safely and effectively supervised in the 
community . . . . Whether an offender is a good candidate for community supervision is a decision 
each court makes, based in part, on the availability of effective local supervision and treatment 
resources available to address the offender’s specific risk factors. 
Id. 
263. Id. at 29. 
264. Id. at 31. 
265. Id. 
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towards each available intervention method, helping to determine the most cost-
effective and socially productive way to funnel available funds.266 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The federal courts, through the Plata litigation, have applied enough pressure 
on California lawmakers to the point that the legislature has begun to reform over 
thirty years of mostly ineffective sentencing laws. The past laws have created 
high costs, a ballooning prison population, and a statewide recidivism rate of 
nearly seventy percent.267 Many of the major reforms that Realignment makes to 
California’s sentencing laws constitute a much-needed shift away from sending 
low-level offenders to expensive incarceration in state prisons, instead creating a 
newfound focus on punishing such offenders locally.268 These changes will not 
only lead to further drops in the state’s overpopulated prison system, but should 
also make great strides towards the state’s additional goals of cost and recidivism 
reduction without leading to a drop in public safety.269 What is most likely to 
prove to be Realignment’s greatest reform is its codification of the state’s 
encouragement of the counties to use evidence-based sentencing practices and 
policies that would steer many low-level offenders away from incarceration in 
county jails.270 
However, merely stating that the state finds certain interventions effective in 
meeting its goals is not enough to get certain counties to end sentencing practices 
that focus heavily on incarcerating many low-level offenders.271 In bestowing 
more responsibility and discretion in local governments in handling local 
offenders, Realignment gives local government officials the ability to largely 
ignore best practices and continue with incarceration-heavy policies.272 In fact, a 
large portion of Realignment’s subsidy structure creates an incentive for counties 
to rely heavily on incarceration by expanding the amount of money available for 
jail construction and making it easier for counties to obtain funding for that 
purpose.273 Additionally, the setup of CCPs as the main policy-making bodies for 
implementing Realignment at the county level creates a lack of uniformity in 
state-wide sentencing practices, with some counties choosing to implement 
evidence-based sentencing policies and others opting to rely heavily on jail-based 
 
266. Id. 
267. See supra Part II (detailing the historical and legal background prior to Realignment’s enactment). 
268. See supra Part III (providing a brief summary of Realignment’s major changes). 
269. Id. 
270. See supra Part III.B (highlighting the potential successes of Realignment’s changes). 
271. See supra Part IV.A. 
272. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the financial incentives of other legislation, and the lack of 
financial incentives under Realignment, which tend to undermine the goals of Realignment). 
273. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the political and financial issues with community-based programs 
in the place of incarceration). 
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interventions.274 The combination of this lack of uniformity with the incentives 
created by the state subsidy structure costs the state millions of dollars and 
penalizes counties that have progressive sentencing policies.275 
If Realignment’s reforms are to serve the State’s goals, the uses for which 
counties can utilize available state funding need to change to include 
performance-based payments to counties that successfully reduce their costs and 
recidivism rate.276 There is already an incentive structure in place in California for 
county probation departments that could act as a model.277 Additionally, to 
persuade county officials skeptical of the effectiveness of sentencing alternatives 
that such options are often more effective than jail, the state could mandate 
statewide use of the uniform actuarial risk-needs assessment instrument in 
sentencing decisions.278 The State could base its instrument off of a modified 
version of Virginia’s instrument, giving counties the ability to modify the 
instrument to make it more accurate in determining the best outcomes for those 
within their local communities.279  
California is finally making strides towards a sentencing regime that can 
reduce crime, costs, and prison population. However, such an unprecedented 
transition to community-based corrections for a large population of offenders will 
require much collaboration between the State and its counties and will not be 
easy.280 As one of the drafters of Determinate Sentencing, the last major overhaul 
of California’s sentencing scheme, said about that law: “only future experience 
can provide any definitive answers”281 on how Realignment’s reforms will affect 
California. However, with these changes, the achievement of Realignment’s full 
potential as a model for effective community-based corrections will be one-step 
closer to reality. 
 
 
274. See supra Part IV.B (pointing out an inherit problem with CCPs, in that they may ultimately 
undermine the goals of Realignment). 
275. Id. 
276. See supra Part V.A (proposing subsidies to incentivize counties’ participation in furthering 
Realignment’s goals). 
277. Id. 
278. See supra Part V.B (proposing a RNA similar to Virginia’s risk assessment instrument to assist in 
sentencing under Realignment). 
279. Id. 
280. See supra Part IV (highlighting the inherit issues of having fifty-eight individual CCPs). 
281. Cassou & Taugher, supra note 36, at 30. 
